








"We Can't Give Up Now":
Global Health Optimism and Polio Eradication in Pakistan
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The Polio Eradication Initiative, the largest coordinated public health project in history, is currently facing serious difficulties. For years, it has tried and failed to eliminate polio from its last strongholds in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Nigeria. Drawing on document analysis as well as participant observation and interviews in Pakistan, Atlanta, Geneva, and Montreal, I explore how officials in the Polio Eradication Initiative systematically devalued or quieted evidence that eradication was not achievable and emphasized evidence that it was achievable, thus creating a string of optimistic projections. Polio eradication's culture of optimism ensures the continuation of the project by convincing donors and officials alike that eradication is immanent. At the same time, it prevents open, objective analysis of the problems the project faces.
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"WE CAN'T GIVE UP NOW":




Eradication, the permanent obliteration of a disease,1 is a powerful ideal. WHO Director-General Margaret Chan has called it  "the ultimate contribution for sustainable health development" (Chan 2007a), and it attracts high profile supporters such as Bill and Melinda Gates (Gates and Gates 2007). Yet eradication programs have a high risk of failure and a high degree of difficulty. In the twentieth century, seven major eradication programs were attempted — against hookworm, yellow fever, yaws, malaria, smallpox, polio, and guinea worm —but only the Smallpox Eradication Program succeeded. 
Eradication programs have been characterized historically by striking optimism. The Malaria Eradication Program is an excellent case in point: between 1955 and 1969, the project used about 1.4 billion dollars, a third of the WHO’s operating budget during that time (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 1993; Seytre and Shaffer 2005). While eradication proved elusive, postwar optimism was a hallmark of the program, and historian Randall Packard writes, "faith in the transformative power of western technology made the high risk gamble of eradication appear to be a logical choice" (1998:229). Two new technical tools—DDT against the vector, chloroquine to treat the disease—inspired such confidence.  “While keeping in mind the realities one can nevertheless be confident that malaria is well on its way toward oblivion,” Rockefeller Foundation malariologist Paul Russell wrote in Man’s Mastery of Malaria in 1955. “Already as a malariologist, I feel premonitory twinges of lonesomeness, and in my own organization I am now a sort of ‘last survivor’” (Russell 1955:viii). At times maintaining this optimism required a bit of maneuvering: for example, an unsuccessful anopheles mosquito eradication project in Sardinia was recast as a successful "experiment" focusing on malaria not on anopheles mosquitoes, maintaining the legitimacy both of the program and of the global public health concept of eradication (Brown 1998).
The question of how development officials filter negative information about their projects has long been of interest to anthropologists and other scholars of development. In 1967, Albert Hirschman described the phenomenon of the ‘hiding hand’ in development projects: potential problems were often underestimated in the planning stages, but that when such problems arose creative solutions were usually found—solutions that in many cases resulted in superior projects (Hirschman 1967). More recently, James Ferguson (1994) argued that throughout project planning, development officials consistently frame the problems they target as ones for which solutions exist. Unlike Hirschman, Ferguson argued that this resulted in projects ill suited to meet their stated goals. Beyond the planning stages, Quarles van Ufford (1993: 138) argued that many development projects rely "upon maintaining—or creating—sufficient ignorance about what was happening locally" that donors feel their plans are being seamlessly implemented even when they are not.
In this article, I update and extend this literature, using the contemporary example of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative. While the program has made enormous progress, bringing the worldwide polio case count down from hundreds of thousands of cases a year to around a thousand, completing the task in difficult and intractable areas has proved elusive, despite funding of nearly US $1 billion per year (World Health Organization 2010b). Here, I explore the ways in which officials in the Polio Eradication Initiative systematically devalued or quieted evidence that eradication was not achievable, while they emphasized evidence that it was achievable, so  creating a string of optimistic projections. Part of the reason for optimism in polio eradication, I will argue, is strategic. Because eradication is so high-risk, its proponents must defend their project against those who argue that limited funding would be better spent elsewhere. However, optimism in global health goes beyond simple strategy: it is a cultural characteristic of the Polio Eradication Initiative, one with important effects. First, the culture of optimism ensures the continuation of the project by obscuring existing problems and convincing donors and officials alike that eradication is imminent. Second, the culture of optimism makes polio eradication more difficult by preventing open, objective analysis of the problems the project faces.
	This work fits firmly into the field of the anthropology of global health, the study of the organizations that design, fund, and administer global health projects (Foster 1976, 1987). The anthropology of development agencies and on global health agencies—whose paradigms, structure, and sources of funding remain rather separate from those of development agencies more generally—is a growing field. But until very recently, the literature on the internal workings of global health agencies consisted of a handful of excellent works  ADDIN EN.CITE (Justice 1986; Nichter 1996; Pfeiffer 2003; Smith 2003).	
	As an eradication program, the Polio Eradication Initiative is in some ways a special case. In important other ways, however, it is similar to many of the largest projects underway in global health. The Polio Eradication Initiative was a pioneering global health partnership, now the model for global health giving. It is also, like many other major projects, an internationally funded and administered project that works through government health systems and focuses on one health issue. The Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations (GAVI); the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria; the Stop TB Partnership; and the Measles Initiative are similar in many respects to the Polio Eradication Initiative, and my discussion of the culture of the Polio Eradication Initiative likely applies to some extent to these other large projects.	

METHODS
This paper is based on multi-sited ethnographic research carried out with the Polio Eradication Initiative in 2006-2010, and focusing on Pakistan, one of the last four countries with endemic polio transmission (the others are India, Afghanistan, and Nigeria). The research includes a study of vaccination in rural Pakistan (Closser 2010), and work with Rotary International.  In this article, I draw specifically on ethnographic research with polio eradication planners in Atlanta (at the CDC), Geneva (at the World Health Organization) and Islamabad (at Pakistan’s National Institute of Health and the World Health Organization), as well as with donors in Pakistan, the United States and Canada. Such multi-sited ethnography has gained currency in anthropology as a way of describing issues tied up in the world system (Marcus 1995). In the course of my research, I “followed the project,” analyzing the progression of Global Polio Eradication Initiative policy from Geneva to a city in the Punjab (Markowitz 2001). 
In 2006-07, I spent eleven months in ethnographic research in Atlanta, Geneva, and Pakistan. My central site was the Pakistani National Institutes of Health in Islamabad, home to the World Health Organization (WHO)’s Islamabad office and the government officials responsible for childhood immunization in the country. Both WHO and government employees were accustomed to visits by foreign researchers, and I was quickly assimilated into the role of foreign consultant. I was given a desk in the National Surveillance Cell, invited to participate in planning meetings, and granted access to the Polio Eradication Initiative surveillance data and files, including most reports and email correspondence generated by the project since 2000. I spent over four months in Islamabad, during which time I attended about 60 formal meetings, including the two weekly official meetings for polio eradication and more formal events such as the Technical Advisory Group (TAG) meeting, a two-day convening of epidemiologists, donors, and advisors from all over the world. I also conducted fifteen formal, semi-structured interviews, lasting between thirty minutes and an hour, with WHO, UNICEF, Rotary, and Pakistani government officials, and  representatives of major bilateral donors to polio eradication such as USAID, CIDA (Canada), JICA (Japan), and DFID (the UK). 
To better understand the culture and perspectives of the international health professionals who procure funding and create policy for the Polio Eradication Initiative, I also attended meetings, conducted interviews with officials, and undertook participant observation and archival research at the WHO headquarters in Geneva and the headquarters of the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta. In both places, my status was that of a temporary visitor. Finally, I reviewed published literature and internal documents produced by and about the Polio Eradication Initiative since its inception in 1988.

In 2009-2010, I carried out participant observation with Rotary International, one of polio eradication's major donors, attending local meetings as well as larger conferences, including the international conference in Montreal in 2010. In all, I attended about 30 Rotary meetings, attended (and in several cases, participated in) about 10 Rotary-sponsored talks and panels on polio eradication, and conducted interviews with 5 Rotarians. 
I entered fieldnotes, interview transcripts, and all collected documents into the computer program Atlas.ti. Using the grounded-theory method of analysis ((cf.Bernard and Ryan 1998; Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw 1995), I coded all data for relevant themes (for example, codes used in the preparation of this paper included "optimism," "cross border," and "monovalent vaccines"). To analyze this data, I examined all excerpts with a given code and looked for patterns in the data. 

THE CULTURE OF OPTIMISM
In 2007, 2008, and 2009, each of Pakistan’s 30 million children under 5 was targeted for vaccination between four and nine times by teams traveling door-to-door  ADDIN EN.CITE (World Health Organization 2008, 2009b, 2010d). Yet poliovirus transmission continues at a low but persistent level in the country. In 2007, there were 32 confirmed cases of polio in Pakistan, but that number jumped to 118 in 2008 and 89 in 2009  ADDIN EN.CITE (World Health Organization 2008, 2009a, 2010c). 
Eradicating polio from Pakistan is extraordinarily difficult for several reasons. Fecal-oral transmission of poliovirus is very efficient in Pakistan's hot climate, high population density, and poor water and sanitation infrastructure. In addition, the per-dose efficacy of oral polio vaccine (OPV) in South Asia is low—children may need to be vaccinated ten or more times to ensure immunity, with at least a month between each dose (Grassly, et al. 2006).2  Political and organizational issues also present major challenges (Closser 2010). Pakistan is being pulled apart by power struggles between the army, political parties, lawyers’ associations, the United States, and the Taliban, and polio eradication is not a political priority. Natural disasters – a major earthquake in 2005, flooding in 2010 –further diverted political attention from polio. Eradication is not a priority for the Pakistani populace, either: polio is  ranked 34th in one analysis of causes of healthy years lost in the country (Hyder and Morrow 2000), and it is not a disease that concerns mothers greatly.3 
The difficulties faced by the Polio Eradication Initiative should not have come as a surprise to public health planners. Both weak political commitment and the difficulty of eliminating polio in high-temperature, high-population-density areas, were discussed as early as 1984 by people considering whether eradication of the disease was feasible (Chin 1984; Jordan 1984; Robbins 1984). The fact that OPV was less effective in India than in industrialized countries was observed in the 1970s and discussed in mid-1980s conferences on the feasibility of eradication (John 1984). Researchers also knew in the mid-80s that polio eradication would be epidemiologically difficult in South Asia, although precisely how many doses of OPV would be needed to confer population immunity in difficult areas was not clearly established (Jordan 1984; Robbins 1984). Similarly, the fact that all the world's countries have not simultaneously embraced polio eradication as a top priority should hardly come as a surprise to seasoned global health planners. In short, the problems that polio eradication faces were predictable.
	But throughout the Polio Eradication Initiative’s 20-year lifespan, these issues have been minimized or disregarded entirely by international officials. Instead, a consistently optimistic stream of rhetoric and planning has proceeded as if these difficulties did not exist. To be fair, no one knew just how serious they would become, but the rhetoric of polio eradication in the mid-90s seems willfully naïve in retrospect. For example, in 1993, planners believed that if all endemic countries conducted two mass campaigns from fixed points per year by 1995, supplemented with house-to-house “mop-up” activities twice per year in stubborn areas by 1997, polio would be eradicated by the year 2000 (Ward, et al. 1993). Worldwide, countries were not sufficiently enthused about polio eradication to adopt it on this schedule (all countries did not begin mass vaccination until 1998), but even if they had, this schedule of immunizations would have been woefully inadequate to interrupt transmission in places like Pakistan. For the past ten years, Pakistan has done door-to-door campaigns multiple times a year (an endeavor well beyond what was outlined in 1993), yet polio transmission continues.
	Just how optimistic planners have been over the course of polio eradication can be seen clearly in projections of the cost, scale, and duration of the project. The end date for the project, in Pakistan and globally, has always been the topic of hopeful speculation and planning: 
	1987: “Global eradication could be achieved as early as 1995” (Hinman, et al. 1987:835)

1994: It was assumed polio eradication could be achieved in Pakistan in “two to three years” (CDC official, interview, Atlanta)

1995: “Can polio be eradicated on target by the year 2000? Yes, it can.” (World Health Organization 1995:4)

1998: “It is evident that wild poliovirus transmission worldwide can be interrupted by the end of the year 2000 or shortly thereafter, and that global eradication can be certified by the target date of 2005, provided the resources needed for both efforts are rapidly made available.” (World Health Organization 1998a:6)

2001: “The TAG reaffirms that it is epidemiologically feasible to eradicate wild poliovirus from Pakistan by the end of 2002. The next six months are the most critical period in the effort to eradicate polio from Pakistan.” (Pakistan Technical Advisory Group, Cairo)

2004: “God willing, with our collective support, we will add another chapter of glory to the history of public health and mankind by eradicating poliomyelitis this year.” Muhammad Nasir Khan, Minister of Health, Pakistan (Khan 2004)

2005: “The consultation has concluded that Pakistan can stop WPV [wild poliovirus] transmission in 2005.” (World Health Organization 2005b) 

2006: “I am still very hopeful that an aggressive approach will stop transmission in Pakistan in 2006.” (WHO official, interview, Geneva)

2007: “The remaining period of 2007 presents an exceptional and unprecedented opportunity to interrupt wild poliovirus transmission in the last remaining transmission zones of Afghanistan and Pakistan.” (Afghanistan/Pakistan Technical Advisory Group, Islamabad: 1) 

Tied to optimism about the end date for polio eradication is optimism about the amount of funding necessary to see the program to completion. In 1988, planners claimed polio could be eradicated for only US $150 million (World Health Organization 1988). In 1995, the estimate had risen to US $800 million (Ward and Hull 1995). By 1996, with the intensification of activities, the figure was raised to US $2.5 billion (World Health Organization 1996). By the end of 2010, nearly US $8 billion had been spent on the effort to eradicate polio.. In this article, I  useethnographic data to explore how, despite compelling reasons for skepticism, such optimistic projections are created, maintained, and accepted in polio eradication.


MINIMIZING PROBLEMS, EXAGGERATING SOLUTIONS
	International planners knew the problems polio eradication faced in nuanced detail. I was consistently impressed and humbled by how well Polio Eradication Initiative officials in Islamabad, and even Geneva, understood the complexities both of local communities’ attitudes towards polio immunization and the knotty dynamics of vaccination campaign implementation in district health systems in a variety of contexts across Pakistan.   But while they knew these problems well, they minimized their importance in public statements. They also exaggerated the effectiveness of the tools at hand. International officials consistently claimed that (all evidence to the contrary) polio eradication was going well. I explore this phenomenon using two case studies: of cross border transmission between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and of monovalent oral polio vaccines. 

Cross-Border Strategies
	Given the significant population movement between Pakistan and Afghanistan, coordinating immunization activities between the two countries has long been a priority for the Polio Eradication Initiative. As early as 1998, references was made in a regional plan of the importance of "coordinating poliomyelitis eradication efforts in border areas" (World Health Organization 1998c:29), and even before Pakistan had implemented nationwide house-to-house immunization, attention was given to the Afghanistan border. Two special immunization rounds along the border were held in 1998, with 2.1 Pakistani children immunized in the first round and 1.6 million in the second round (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 1999). 
In 2002, the project reported that "vaccination and surveillance activities are coordinated closely between the two countries and include synchronization of SIAs [Supplemental Immunization Activities], establishment of border vaccination posts, and regular exchange of data" (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2002). 
	These activities were developed further in the coming years. By early 2006, there were fixed vaccination teams at major border crossing posts, border villages had been enumerated, and refugee children were vaccinated upon their return to Afghanistan. Vaccination teams at one fixed border post immunized more than 150,000 children in 2005 (World Health Organization 2006c).
	But in 2006, there were still pockets of ongoing virus circulation along the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan, and surveillance data showed that viruses on both sides of the border were genetically closely related (World Health Organization 2007b). The border is a particularly difficult area because infrastructure is nearly nonexistent in many places, nomads and refugees move freely across the international boundary, and UN security regulations mean that oversight by WHO or UNICEF employees is all but impossible.
	In late 2006, in an attempt to improve the coordination of efforts, meetings between high-level Pakistani and Afghani health officials were held. Preparation for these meetings was intense in WHO offices, both because high-level attention to polio was limited, and because the meeting involved potentially touchy political issues (one official said he was "nervous" because he had heard that Afghani officials were arguing that all of their polio cases were "coming from Pakistan"). Officials from UNICEF and WHO spent days preparing 'key messages' for the Minister of Health. 
	The meeting had three outcomes. First, both countries agreed to increase the number of permanent fixed points on the border. Second, the Ministers of Health each agreed to immunize one child on the other side of the border, an entirely symbolic gesture. Third, they agreed to meet every three to four months (an agreement not entirely kept). These steps were useful but far from revolutionary.
	In their public presentations of the issue, however, Polio Eradication officials minimized the difficulty of containing cross-border transmission, and exaggerated the effectiveness of the Afghanistan-Pakistan meeting. Indeed, the arguably minor results of these meetings were touted as the key to solving all of Pakistan’s problems. In February 2007, the WHO held a conference in Geneva to rally donors and endemic-country governments. Admitting that “these last 4 countries have been 'stuck' at 500-1500 cases/year, in the same geographic areas,” WHO and its partner agencies offered donors “new approaches in each of the 4 endemic areas” (World Health Organization, et al. 2007). In Pakistan and Afghanistan, they touted “new cross-border strategies” as an innovative approach that would end transmission. This framing of the issues suggested that any problems would be solved by these tactics. But while overlooking the fact that Pakistan and Afghanistan have had “cross-border strategies” since 1998, this “new solution” to Pakistan’s problems ignored significant centers of ongoing transmission, such as the city of Karachi, not on the border with Afghanistan. 
	In 2010, these same border posts were still being promoted as new strategies. In a speech given to Rotarians at their international conference in Montreal in June 2010, Bruce Aylward, the head of polio eradication at the World Health Organization, said that the project has "started to rewrite the polio eradication playbook" in the last few years. "In the rough-and-tumble world of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border," he told the thousands of assembled Rotarians, Rotary built shelters for vaccinators working at cross-border posts. But while such shelters are a useful convenience for vaccinators working in the heat, they are unlikely to fundamentally change the situation along the border. Polio Eradication officials consistently underplay the complexity of the problems they face, and exaggerate the potential for small steps to solve these problems.

Monovalent Vaccines
	There are three distinct types of poliovirus –Type 1, Type 2, and Type 3. Type 2 has been eradicated; Type 1 and Type 3 have not. Immunity to one type of poliovirus does not confer immunity to the other two types. Polio vaccines have traditionally contained all three types of poliovirus—hence called “trivalent” vaccines.
	In 2005, the Global Polio Eradication Initiative introduced monovalent oral polio vaccines (mOPV1), which confer immunity to only one type of poliovirus. Their advantage is that they are better at producing immunity for the specific type of virus they target.4 Their disadvantage, of course, is that they protect against only one of the two currently circulating types of poliovirus.
	The official rhetoric in the international community upon the development of mOPV1 was very enthusiastic. As in the historical example of malaria eradication, faith in the transformative power of technology was strong. "It is not a panacea," an official report said, but "the development of monovalent OPV (mOPV1) is being heralded by some as a ‘magic bullet’ to eradicate the final strains of wild poliovirus type 1 transmission in the world" (World Health Organization 2005a:19). The global Advisory Committee on Polio Eradication met in late 2005 and concluded that “with sufficient resources and expanded use of mOPV1, all polio-affected countries except Nigeria can stop this disease by mid-2006” (World Health Organization 2006a: 4). Since there was only one case of Type 3 paralytic polio in Pakistan in 2005, international experts concluded that Pakistan should switch to the monovalent Type 1 vaccine (World Health Organization 2005b). 
	However, the introduction of mOPV1 in Pakistan did not have quite the effect that was hoped. By the end of 2006, 40 cases of paralytic polio were found in Pakistan, up from 28  in 2005 (see Figure 1). The use of mOPV1 was associated with a reduction in the number of Type 1 cases, to 20 in 2006 compared to 27 in 2005. The unintended side effect of the use of mOPV1 in Pakistan, however, was a resurgence of Type 3 poliovirus: 20 cases of paralytic Type 3 polio in 2006, up from only one in 2005. 
	But Polio Eradication Officials consistently minimized or disregarded the negative side effects of the use of monovalent vaccine. The surveillance bulletin sent to Pakistani districts in April 2007, for example, stated in bold letters on the front page: “In 2007, for the first time ever, there are fewer type 1 polio cases than type 3 cases in key endemic areas suggesting that the strategy of wide-scale use of monovalent oral polio vaccine type 1 (mOPV1)—which protects children twice as fast against type 1 polio than the traditionally-used trivalent OPV—is working” (emphasis in original). The resurgence in Type 3 was not mentioned.
	International officials also exaggerated the positive impact of the vaccines. A document from the WHO Eastern Mediterranean Region in Cairo stated: “The strategic measures adopted by the programme since 2004 . . . as well as the use of monovalent OPV type 1 (mOPV1) have led to substantial improvements in the quality of supplementary immunization activities and in the immunization status of children in Pakistan” (World Health Organization 2006b: 7). 
	Decisions about the type of vaccine to use in a given area—mOPV1, mOPV3, or trivalent vaccine—are judgment calls; the monovalent vaccines were new, and international experts in Geneva and Atlanta, and WHO officials in Islamabad, did their best when deciding what vaccines to use in what area. My aim here is not to second-guess those decisions, but to draw attention to how problems are framed.	 
	In December 2009, the Polio Eradication Initiative introduced bivalent vaccine, effective against both Type 1 and Type 3 virus. While this vaccine is promising—initial research shows that its per-dose efficacy is greater than that of the trivalent vaccine (World Health Organization 2010a)—its operational effectiveness has yet to be proven. Still, a WHO representative told Rotarians in at their international conference June 2010 that bivalent vaccine "is clearly a game changer when it comes to eradication." And, with a new vaccine to tout, the WHO representative admitted that it is "very difficult to optimize the balance of monovalent and trivalent polio vaccines." 

STRATEGY AND CULTURE
	The majority of funding for polio eradication is provided by donors—including  USAID, the governments of the UK and Japan, the Gates Foundation, and the World Bank—who are not involved in day-to-day administration of polio eradication but who ultimately determine whether the program will continue. Donors have, over the past five years or so, consistently been on the receiving end of the Polio Eradication Initiative’s optimistic projections, and they are acutely aware that polio eradication is more difficult than they were initially led to believe. A few remain staunchly committed to the project: Bill Gates recently called polio eradication his "top priority" ( 2011), despite reports that he harbors some concerns (Guth 2010). But some have quietly begun shifting funds to other projects. Others say that they “have not lost faith yet” but view the Polio Eradication Initiative’s projections with an increasingly skeptical eye. 
	Donor skepticism is a real problem. In 2006, an article was published in Science arguing that despite the “enormous benefit to mankind” represented by the Polio Eradication Initiative, “global eradication is unlikely to be achieved” (Arita, Nakane, and Fenner 2006: 852). Accompanying their article was a more general “news focus” piece, which included skeptical viewpoints from several prominent figures in public health. D. A. Henderson, who was head of the Smallpox Eradication Program, was quoted as saying, “However diligent they are, however much the staff does its best, there are very serious obstacles that militate against eradicating polio” (Roberts 2006: 832).  
The sentiments in the Science article were a serious threat to the Polio Eradication Initiative. They reinforced the doubts of many donors; by later that year, Pakistan’s Polio Eradication Initiative was running out of money. Several major donors had begun scaling back their support for polio eradication. For example, one bilateral aid agency scaled back its usual annual contribution of US $8 to 10 million for oral polio vaccine to just US $3.9 million in 2006. This reduction in funding, said someone familiar with the agency, was due to the opinion of officials in the donor country that the program was a “failure.”
	A representative of another bilateral donor agency told me that they were concerned about very low routine immunization coverage in Pakistan. “One reason may be—polio,” he said, noting that time spent organizing and carrying out polio vaccination campaigns was time not spent on other health issues. “This is a difficult situation for us,” he added. “We are still believing that there is a chance that this disease could be eradicated.” This donor, too, had scaled back its funding.
	WHO officials in Geneva were acutely aware of the need to for real progress to keep donors on board. “Donors are tired,” Bruce Aylward told the media. “And there’s always a risk with goals and targets. We have four countries left. If three hit the goal, you are in good shape. If all four of them miss, people will want to take another hard look” (Donnelly 2007). A WHO employee was more direct: “If we don’t finish somewhere by the end of the year, we’re going to be screwed.”
	Part of the reason for the optimism that characterizes polio eradication, then, is that it is strategic: people at WHO headquarters in Geneva spoke about spinning information positively “for the donors." The optimistic statements prepared by WHO, in which governments are said to be committed, new vaccines are touted as breakthroughs, and eradication is ever imminent, are in part calculated attempts to keep donors on board. The more skeptical donors become, the more resolutely optimistic WHO employees  feel they have to be to ensure that funding continues. Sometimes, a few WHO employees told me, they deliberately take a “glass half full” approach.
	That said, WHO optimism  is not simply calculated. Optimism in polio eradication is a culture. It is not just a strategy for acquiring and maintaining the support necessary to implement such a large-scale project (though it is that sometimes), but is a socially shared symbolic system. WHO officials were resolutely optimistic with each other, in conversations not aimed at donors or at fatigued workers. For example, in one meeting looking at a map of the resurgence of Type 3 polio, a WHO official said, "If we imagine that these blue triangles—P3—are not here, then we are much better placed for P1." With no donor present,  optimism persisted, in the familiar guise of minimizing problems. 
	People at the highest levels of leadership genuinely believed, it seemed to me, that eradication of polio was just around the corner. When asked about prospects for the future, a WHO official told me in 2007, “A few small different things happening and we could have finished two years ago.” The circulation of poliovirus was “tenuous,” he said, “I think this is going to be a very good year for us.” 
	One official who had created extremely optimistic projections for the Polio Eradication Initiative in the mid-90s no longer works within polio eradication, and is now not so optimistic. She explained that her former optimism was in part because it was “work done within the bowels of WHO—I was sitting there… you get caught up in the group and you believe the things the epidemiologists say and the technical folks say.” Optimism in polio eradication is a social phenomenon.  
	The WHO's optimistic organizational culture was striking to people at the CDC, which is another partner in polio eradication, less involved with donors. One person who had worked with both agencies told me that at CDC “there is optimism but there’s also—a kind of—reality optimism,” meaning that they were not as wildly optimistic as WHO. A CDC employee said that “WHO has always erred on the side of optimism” while the CDC tends to think “realism would be better” and “doesn’t like BS.”  But the culture of the WHO, like all cultures, is based in social organization and economics—and WHO officials needed donors for their program to survive.

ENSURING THE CONTINUATION OF THE PROJECT

One major effect of optimism is that it ensures that the Polio Eradication Initiative has enough money to continue. In February 2007, due to the concerns of donors discussed above, the monetary situation for polio eradication was desperate. The WHO hosted an “Urgent Stakeholder’s Meeting” in Geneva with government representatives of polio-endemic countries and representatives of major “partners” and donors. The meeting was framed as an opportunity to assess whether polio eradication was worth continuing. However, by most accounts it was largely a festival of optimism; “we can’t give up now, was more of the feeling,” someone who attended the meeting told me. 
At the meeting, WHO Director-General Margaret Chan said, "We have already eradicated one of the three strains of wild polio virus. We have improved monovalent vaccines for targeted immunization.... We are on the verge of victory" (Chan 2007a). Monovalent vaccines and cross-border strategies were touted as new tools that would secure the success of polio eradication in Pakistan. 
The meeting was successful. High-level officials at key donor organizations were sufficiently convinced of the likelihood of polio eradication to provide additional funding, thus granting a stay of execution. A representative of a bilateral donor agency in Islamabad told me that the result of the meeting was to “put a lot of pressure on us. . . The meeting has done some—I don’t know if it was good work.” He added that before the pressure the meeting generated, “we were not planning to provide” any funding in 2007.
	Bilateral donors were persuaded to give additional funding, even if they were skeptical about the effectiveness of that funding. For example, in the following exchange at an international meeting in 2007, a bilateral donor representative was complaining that the expected date for eradication of polio from Pakistan had been pushed back three years in a row. Each year she was asked to come up with exceptional funding to assist in finishing the job:

Donor representative: I almost wish I hadn’t believed you. . . We also have to be 	realistic—what if it doesn’t happen?. . . Otherwise it’s very difficult to do 	it on a year to year ad hoc basis.
WHO official: I can understand your disappointment. I hope you will believe 	me—I think this year the target is more realistic—[monovalent vaccines] 	have not been widely tried yet. I do believe this window of opportunity is 	more transparent. Have faith.
Ultimately, polio was not eradicated in any of the four endemic countries by 2007—or by 2008, 2009, or 2010. Yet the Polio Eradication Initiative was able to retain its donors. Even in the midst of the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, polio eradication found funding: between August 2008 and March 2009, they received nearly US $700 million—just enough to keep the project running. 
	An important example of how one major group of donors has been convinced to stay committed to polio eradication is the case of Rotary International, an international service club. Rotary is one of the "spearheading partners" of the Polio Eradication Initiative, primarily involved in raising funds and advocating for the project, through its 1.2 million members and the leverage it is able to exert on governments.5 
	At the 2010 Rotary International Convention in Montreal, the importance of eradicating polio was a central theme. In the Bell Centre arena, on a dramatically lit stage, flanked with illuminated fabric columns, speakers addressed a crowd of well over 10,000 Rotarians.  Projected also on the enormous big-screen Jumbotron, speakers from Queen Noor (“eradicating polio will be one of the great building blocks of peace for decades to come”) to Greg Mortenson ("within the next decade it will be totally eradicated") praised Rotary's contributions to the polio eradication effort.
	Bruce Aylward, the head of polio eradication at WHO, was a featured speaker. The conference was held in late June 2010; globally, 390 cases had been reported so far that year. This was somewhat better than in 2009, when 552 cases had been reported. But Aylward told the crowd, to cheers and applause, that "polio is truly and finally on the run from its last strongholds.” He enthusiastically reported news in the most positive light: for example, he told the crowd that "six months have now passed, ladies and gentlemen, without a single child in Uttar Pradesh or Bihar being paralyzed by the most dangerous of the two remaining types of polio." This was technically true—and allowed him to disregard Type 1 transmission.
	After the talk, there was an immediate standing ovation. The man sitting next to me said enthusiastically, "That's the best talk I've heard on polio in a long time." Later, another Rotarian affirmed, “Rotary International should cut Bruce Aylward’s message, put in on a DVD, and send it to every club in the world.”
	Dolly Parton reiterated Aylward's positive message in a speech the next day:
	
Course, Rotary dared to dream big and envisioned a day when not one person would have to suffer polio again. And look at where we are, we're that close to havin' it done! Thanks to you! Praise God! Really, that dream is almost there.

	While promoting positive messages, WHO and Rotary officials minimized criticisms to the program. For example, a Rotarian asked a question about the Science article at a breakout session on polio. A WHO official responded, “I think you just have a lot of grumpy old scientists who aren’t engaged in an exciting initiative and have nothing better to do than complain about it.”
	"Won't we raise 200 million?" a Rotary official asked the audience at the session, to cheers and applause. My Rotary club in rural Vermont raised more than US $2000 for the cause by passing around a jar at meetings. Rotary's commitment is fueled by donations and involvement from members who take the optimistic statements presented them at face value. 


PREVENTING ANALYSIS OF PROBLEMS

	Although optimism helps the project to be funded, , it also prevents deep analysis of tough problems. While there was informal conversation surrounding particularly problematic issues, in public venues serious discussion of problems was often elided or shut down. Many examples of this process occurred at the Technical Advisory Group Meeting for Afghanistan and Pakistan, held in 2007 in Islamabad. 
	First, in preparation for the meeting, officials in Islamabad—as might be expected in any meeting where people's work is being presented to supervisors—were eager to highlight processes that were going well, and not, as one official put it, to "tell about negative sides of the program." Even as the case count increased, Pakistani officials touted "improved access to target children," and highlighted "better cross border coordination with Afghanistan." Even after reviewing the resurgence of Type 3 polio, one official insisted in his presentation that "the monovalent strategy is working."
	The international officials present actively buttressed such interpretations, as illustrated by their statements about monovalent vaccines. “This vaccine has worked,” an international WHO official said. “We knew there were going to be risks. I still believe very much that [using mOPV1] was absolutely the right decision.”  A CDC official added, "mOPV1 has done major damage."
	When people present attempted to open discussion on whether monovalent vaccines had really been successful, they were efficiently quieted. For example, when a foreign consultant (known for speaking his mind) opined that an outbreak of Type 3 polio in north Sindh was due to the use of mOPV1 in that area, a person who worked in Sindh responded: “When we get monovalent type 3 vaccine, that will be the right response for chasing the virus in that area.” A high-ranking WHO official from Geneva said: “I am very satisfied with that response.”	
	 In this meeting and in others like it, the most optimistic possible interpretation of events was actively created and maintained, and dissenting opinions were quieted. At the end of several days of this process, it seemed reasonable for an international WHO official to confidently predict, "If I were a poliovirus in your area, I would be very worried about my long term future." The final report prepared by the Technical Advisory Group highlighted “successful introduction of mOPV1 with a subsequent clear impact on WPV1 [Type 1] transmission” (World Health Organization 2007a: 3).

THE DANGERS OF OPTIMISM	
	Optimism is perhaps a necessary evil. It was probably essential to get polio eradication off the ground, and is not irrelevant to maintaining funding. But it has less positive effects as well. The culture of optimism prevents hard-nosed, objective analysis of what would truly be necessary to achieve polio eradication. By preventing open discussion and debate about the very real difficulties the project faces, the culture of optimism contributes to polio eradication’s current quagmire. 
	The lessons of polio could prove useful to other global health projects. For example, due to the enthusiasm and funding of Bill and Melinda Gates, malaria eradication has been reborn as a global health goal 40 years after its earlier failure. Because of epidemiological differences between the two diseases, the eradication of malaria is much more difficult than polio, and even  malaria eradication’s most fervent supporters admit that the tools to eradicate malaria are not currently available. Yet they have faith that these will be developed through new research and so push ahead: “We’ll use today’s tools today,” one enthusiast said, “and tomorrow’s tools tomorrow” (McNeil 2008: F1). The rationale of the Gates Foundation is that the goal of eradication will spur scientific breakthroughs that will make it attainable (Okie 2008). Skeptics argue that malaria is not eradicable with the current means, and that even these tools are vulnerable to insecticide and drug resistance (Kelly-Hope, Ranson, and Hemingway 2008; Mendis, et al. 2009). But in the new malaria eradication, a project in its infancy, the enthusiasm of its high-profile donors  has swept many public health officials along. Immediately after Bill and Melinda Gates announced eradication as a goal, Margaret Chan, WHO Director-General—invoking polio eradication as a model—promised support (reportedly without first discussing the issue with some of the people who would be involved) (Roberts and Enserink 2007): “I . . . pledge WHO’s commitment to move forward with all of you,” Chan announced at the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation Malaria Forum. “And, I dare you to come along with us” (Chan 2007b).  Her enthusiasm was mirrored in other responses. The editors of The Lancet, for example, wrote that “only by setting our collective sights higher will we make the progress we know we can make against malaria” (Lancet 2007: 1457). The “Gates Effect” (Roberts and Enserink 2007)  is so great that many people who believe, with good reason, that malaria eradication is impossible, reportedly feel reluctant to voice that opinion publicly (McNeil 2008).  
	To the credit of the researchers involved, analyses of the challenges of malaria eradication are much more sophisticated than early discussions of the feasibility of eradicating polio  ADDIN EN.CITE (Chin 1984; Feachem, Phillips, Hwang, et al. 2010; Jordan 1984; Tatem, et al. 2010). Reducing malaria prevalence is a worthy goal, and much could be achieved to that end (Feachem, Phillips, Targett, et al. 2010). But the optimism necessary to launch an eradication program against a disease not eradicable with existing methods is, from my perspective, stunning.
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NOTES
1. The definition of the term “eradication” is the subject of some debate (Miller, Barrett, and Henderson 2006; World Health Organization 1998b). The definition I use here is the “permanent reduction to zero of the worldwide incidence of infection caused by a specific agent as a result of deliberate efforts; intervention measures are no longer needed” (Dowdle 1999, emphasis added).
2. Reasons for this likely include: (1) high rates of infection with other enteroviruses in children that compete with vaccine virus; (2) high rates of diarrhea, which may eliminate the vaccine virus from a child's body before it has a chance to infect the child; and (3) high levels of maternal antibodies against polio in young infants that may interfere with vaccine efficacy (Grassly, et al. 2006; Hull, et al. 1994).
3. Generally, people were not opposed to polio immunization. When the immunization teams came to their houses, almost everyone gave drops to their children: the Polio Eradication Initiative’s best estimates of the number of people who refused vaccination for their children was less than 1 percent of the total population. But this acceptance was mostly passive. It was the very rare parent who would bring their child to the health post to get additional doses of vaccine if their child was missed during the campaign. Only one of 26 lower-middle-class mothers I interviewed in the Punjab said that she would take action by taking her child to the health post if he was missed during polio rounds. 
4. For example, in India monovalent oral Type 1 polio vaccine (mOPV1) protects 80 percent of children against wild poliovirus Type 1 after five doses, compared to fourteen doses for trivalent vaccine (Grassly, et al. 2007).
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